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The Tragedy and Promise of Self-Determination 
Brian Slattery 
abstract.  The principle of self-determination, like Janus, has two faces: negative and posi-
tive. Often understood as enabling the fracture of states into national components, the principle is 
better seen as facilitating the creation of multinational frameworks that foster toleration and hu-
man rights. 
introduction  
In a classic essay, A.C. Bradley argues that the essence of tragedy lies in con-
ﬂict—not between good and evil, as one might expect, but between good and 
good.1 The tragic hero is torn between two rightful but opposing demands: 
The family claims what the state refuses, love requires what honour for-
bids. The competing forces are both in themselves rightful, and so far the 
claim of each is equally justiﬁed; but the right of each is pushed into a 
wrong, because it ignores the right of the other, and demands that abso-
lute sway which belongs to neither alone, but to the whole of which each 
is but a part.2 
Faced with this conﬂict, the tragic hero identiﬁes wholly with one claim or 
the other—Antigone single-mindedly fulﬁlls her duty to her dead brother, Ro-
meo pursues his love for Juliet at all costs—and so brings on catastrophe. 
 
1. A.C. BRADLEY, Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy, in OXFORD LECTURES ON POETRY 69, 70-75 (2d ed. 
1909). 
2. Id. at 71-72. For a thoughtful application of Bradley’s theory to Canadian federalism, see SAM-
UEL V. LASELVA, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PARADOXES, ACHIEVE-
MENTS, AND TRAGEDIES OF NATIONHOOD 5-9 (1996). 
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This, then, is the tragedy of national self-determination, which takes an un-
doubted good—solidarity with the national group—and elevates it to a position 
of supremacy, driving out another important good—fellowship with those be-
yond the cultural and ethnic divide. So doing, it adopts a constricted and impov-
erishing version of the self, a version that shuns the unfamiliar, the alien, the 
unsettling, in favor of the familiar, the habitual, the reassuring. But the self may 
also be understood in a more expansive way, one that transcends barriers of cul-
ture, religion, language, and ethnicity, and embraces multiple forms of identity 
and mutual engagement, recognizing wider forms of community that nurture 
toleration and human rights.3 Here lies the “promise” of this Essay’s title: self-
determination for rather than self-determination from, positive rather than neg-
ative. 
Negative self-determination contemplates a severing of broader communal 
bonds in favor of exclusive ethnic and cultural loyalties, thus advancing one good 
at the expense of another, as with the tragic hero. Positive self-determination, by 
contrast, seeks to reconcile and strengthen the multiple bonds that connect us 
one to the other—individual to individual, group to group, nation to nation, 
state to state. It furthers this goal by fashioning constitutional frameworks that 
embrace a variety of national and cultural groups, habituating each to tolerate 
and respect the other, while inculcating awareness that together they are stronger 
and more prosperous—indeed, more fully human—than when apart. 
This is the argument pursued here. Our starting point is the classic theory of 
national self-determination, which promotes a negative version of the right and, 
on scrutiny, turns out to be incomplete, a fragment of a hidden whole. Our 
search for the missing pieces draws us to positive self-determination, as exem-
pliﬁed by a political process unfolding in East Africa today. 
First, a few clariﬁcations. In speaking of self-determination in its most gen-
eral sense, I mean the power of a group to determine its own international status: 
whether to remain, become, or cease to be an independent state. This approach 
assumes that the right of self-determination refers primarily to the right of sov-
ereign states to determine their status freely under international law, as when 
they maintain their independence, join a federation or merge with another state. 
Nevertheless, the right of self-determination arguably may also vest in certain 
substate groups that aspire to full international statehood. It is this branch of the 
topic that interests me here. I focus particularly on the right of national self-
 
3. See Jeremy Webber, The Generosity of Toleration, in RECOGNITION VERSUS SELF-DETERMINA-
TION 269 (Avigail Eisenberg et al. eds., 2014). 
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determination, the right of a national group within a state to decide whether or 
not to secede from that state.4 
Of course, theories of national self-determination come in many forms. 
Here, I deal only with the standard theory, which portrays the right as general in 
nature, one held by all national groups that meet certain basic criteria, rather 
than as a particular right arising exclusively in special circumstances, such as 
when a group suffers severe oppression at the hands of a central government.5 
Under the standard theory, the right of national self-determination is unilateral 
in nature, so it may be exercised without the consent of any other entity, whether 
an existing state or a substate group. As such, it contrasts with more moderate 
versions of the right, which are interdependent or mutual rather than unilateral, 
requiring the participation and consent of other entities whose vital interests are 
affected. Finally, the theory gives a national group the right to decide whether to 
gain full independence as a sovereign state in international law, rather than, say, 
simply the right to gain a measure of internal autonomy or to participate in the 
creation of institutions of self-government.6 
The following discussion deals with the right of national determination as a 
matter of morality and justice, without attempting to determine how far inter-
national law recognizes such a right.7 However, our analysis may also shed some 
light in this direction. 
i .   negative national self-determination  
The classic argument for a right of national self-determination proceeds in 
three stages.8 It starts with the proposition that the self-identity and well-being 
 
4. For theories that justify self-determination on grounds broader than national identity, see, for 
example, CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, A THEORY OF SECESSION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL 
SELF-DETERMINATION (2005); and Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 105 ETH-
ICS 352 (1990). 
5. For the particular version of the right, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
6. See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-96 (1996). 
7. For an excellent discussion, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 97-148 (2d ed. 2007). 
8. This account draws in particular on Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determina-
tion, 87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990). For fuller analysis of their arguments, see Brian Slattery, The Par-
adoxes of National Self-Determination, 32 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 703, 716-22 (1994). For other ap-
proaches to national self-determination, see, for example, MARGARET MOORE, THE ETHICS OF 
NATIONALISM (2001); David Miller, On Nationality, 2 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 409 (1996); 
Christopher W. Morris, The Case for National Self-Determination, in THE THEORY OF SELF-DE-
TERMINATION 32 (Fernando R. Tesón ed., 2016); Kai Nielsen, Liberal Nationalism and Seces-
sion, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 103, 110 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998). 
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of many individuals is grounded in their membership in groups. While volun-
tary groups such as sports clubs or artistic associations may be enriching and 
worthwhile, normally they are not fundamental to a person’s life. By contrast, 
membership in certain ethnic, cultural, or religious groups is often central to an 
individual’s sense of self-identity and well-being. These groups are generally dis-
tinguished by the fact that they have rich, multifaceted cultures, which are trans-
mitted down the generations and affect many important aspects of people’s lives. 
A group that plays this central role is termed a “national” or “encompassing” 
group.9 
The importance of national groups to the lives of their members means that 
there is a strong link between communal prosperity and individual well-being. 
Where the group’s culture suffers from decay or repression, the options and op-
portunities available to its members may correspondingly shrink and their dig-
nity and self-respect may be adversely affected. And to lack the ability to partic-
ipate in a national culture is often to experience serious limitations on one’s 
opportunities and abilities.10 
This link between individual and communal well-being leads to the second 
proposition, which maintains that a national group has a strong interest in self-
government, that is the ability to govern itself as an independent state with its 
own territories. Self-government permits the group to determine its fortune by 
its own actions, conducting its affairs in the way it considers most conducive to 
its prosperity. Group members are generally better positioned than outsiders to 
judge what is best for the community and to take the initiatives and make the 
sacriﬁces needed to ensure the vitality of the common culture.11 
This reﬂection leads to the ﬁnal proposition, which maintains that the po-
tential value of self-government for a national group is substantial enough to 
give the group an exclusive right to decide whether the circumstances justifying 
self-government are present—whether in the particular context the group’s ter-
ritory should form an independent, self-governing state—in effect the right of 
self-determination.12 This move from the realm of “value” to that of “right” is crit-
ical to the argument. Yet there is a signiﬁcant difference between the two. The 
value that self-government possesses for a national group does not bind anyone 
else, no matter how important it may be to the group. By contrast, a right com-
mands the respect of others, obliging them not to impede its exercise. In the 
 
9. Margalit & Raz, supra note 8, at 442-48. 
10. Id. at 448-50. 
11. Id. at 440-41, 450. 
12. Id. at 456-57. 
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present case, this duty affects ﬁrst and foremost the state governing the territory, 
which is bound to defer to the decision of the national group.13 
This, then, is the classic argument for a right of national self-determination. 
It has the virtue of emphasizing the vital role that communally generated attrib-
utes play in the lives of individuals. Without a rich legacy of languages, social 
norms, religious beliefs, artistic and intellectual resources, and styles of wit and 
play, we would be poor wanderers and babblers indeed. And in order to survive 
and ﬂourish, national cultures may, at times, need structural support in the form 
of special legislative and constitutional regimes enacted by the state. 
But it is unclear why the value of a culture necessarily endows the national 
group with the right to become an independent state, with its own territory and 
the power to govern all residents, nationals and non-nationals alike. Mere value 
does not give rise to a right, in particular when the interests of others are at stake. 
Just because the owners of a condominium townhouse need to expand their 
dwelling in order to accommodate aging parents does not mean they have the 
right to appropriate a slice of the communal gardens. The attribution of a right 
is warranted only where there are sufficient reasons why the other parties af-
fected should respect it.14 Those parties have interests, values, and rights of their 
own, which may well outweigh the interests of the claimant. 
In effect, the assertion of a general right of national self-determination calls 
into play at least two sets of competing interests: those held by the national 
group, and those held by the enfolding state and its citizens, including all those 
living in the affected territory. To establish a right to self-determination, it is not 
enough to demonstrate that self-government is potentially valuable for the na-
tional group. One must also show that this value substantially outweighs the 
interests, values, and rights of the enfolding state and its citizens, and that this 
state of affairs holds true generally and not just in particular instances. 
The question is not whether, in speciﬁc circumstances, the balance of advantage 
tilts in favor of a certain national group, for it may in some instances, as when 
the group has been persecuted by the state. The question is whether, overall, the 
balance between the interests of national groups and complex states is so decid-
edly in favor of national groups as to justify awarding a general right that may 
be exercised without the participation and consent of others affected. In effect, 
the classic argument for recognizing a general right of self-determination con-
siders only one side of the matter. It is radically incomplete. 
Some advocates of the right acknowledge the drawbacks of such a one-sided 
approach but argue there is no alternative to granting national groups what 
 
13. Id. at 460. 
14. I discuss this point more fully in Rights, Communities, and Tradition, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 447, 
453-57 (1991). 
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amounts to a right of self-adjudication. They point out that binding interna-
tional machinery is not available to decide the merits of particular cases where 
national groups seek independence, and such groups are normally in the best 
position to determine how strong their need for independent statehood is.15 
However, this argument is not persuasive. Most international disputes are not 
amenable to resolution by effective adjudication. Yet this fact does not justify a 
rule that automatically awards a right of self-adjudication to one class of dispu-
tant as against another—smaller states as against larger states, for example, or 
the reverse. The absence of adequate international tribunals only leaves the mat-
ter to be resolved by negotiation or political pressure, which may or may not 
yield a satisfactory solution. 
The whole argument rests on the proposition that, where there is a dispute 
between two types of parties, X and Y, and no binding mechanism for adjudicat-
ing the dispute exists, X should always be given the right of self-adjudication—
a right that is binding on Y—because X is best able to judge the merits of its own 
case. But this analysis is faulty, because Y is just as well-qualiﬁed to assess the 
merits of its own case. The argument for awarding a right of self-adjudication is 
equally strong in both instances, or rather equally weak. Neither solution satis-
ﬁes the basic requirement that, for a value to yield a binding right, sufficient 
reasons must be given to show why other affected parties should respect it. 
In sum, there is no reason to systematically prefer the interests of national 
groups over those of enfolding states, unless it can be shown that such groups 
are essentially more valuable or worthy of concern and respect than multina-
tional entities. But that case is hard to make out, and it is not one that most ad-
vocates of national self-determination even attempt. To the contrary, all things 
being equal, multinational states and federations provide the better hope for the 
future—in particular for the nurturing of inter-communal toleration and practi-
cal respect for human rights. A case-study drawn from contemporary East Africa 
may help illustrate the point. 
i i .   positive self-determination  
In 1961, the country of Tanganyika achieved independence under the guid-
ance of Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Formerly a United Nations trust territory 
ruled by Britain, Tanganyika came to statehood on the crest of the post-war wave 
of decolonization that swept away the old European empires. By most accounts, 
Tanganyika’s independence was a classic case of self-determination. Yet the 
country was a far cry from a homogenous nation-state. It comprised some 120 
ethno-cultural groups and at least as many languages, with a remarkable 
 
15. Margalit & Raz, supra note 8, at 457-58. 
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diversity of cultures, religious beliefs, customary laws, and ways of life.16 Tan-
ganyika was hardly unique in this respect. Most post-colonial states in Africa and 
Asia encompass a variety of national groups, differing in ethnicity, culture, lan-
guage, religion, and history.17 Far from being examples of national self-determi-
nation, these countries represent instances of multinational self-determination. 
Julius Nyerere perceived that his ﬁrst and most important task was to build 
a strong sense of Tanganyikan identity, one that would predominate over local 
loyalties without necessarily erasing them. To fulﬁll this goal, he harnessed the 
force of the concept of ujamaa, a Swahili neologism connoting familyhood, social 
solidarity, and mutual obligation.18 He also promoted Swahili as a national lan-
guage, dismantled the old colonial chiefdoms, improved access to education and 
social services throughout the country, recruited politicians and civil servants 
from a broad variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds, inaugurated a one-
party political system, and campaigned tirelessly for the suppression of tribalism 
and racialism.19 More troublingly, perhaps, he used powers of preventive deten-
tion to silence people who, in his view,  threatened national unity.20 
Nyerere also believed that the task of building solidarity did not end at Tan-
ganyika’s borders.21 Like his contemporary, President Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, he held that Africa would remain economically and politically fragile, 
open to outside manipulation and domination, unless it moved toward greater 
political and economic integration in the form of a United States of Africa, or at 
least regional federations as stepping-stones to broader unity.22 Thus, in 1963, 
Nyerere strongly supported the foundation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), whose Charter affirmed that all African States should unite “so that the 
 
16. Indeed, some estimates put the number of ethnic groups as high as 150; for further discussion, 
see Carl Sebastian Laurentius Gahnström, Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania: The 
2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region 38 (May 2012) (unpublished Master’s thesis, 
University of Helsinki), https://helda.helsinki.ﬁ/handle/10138/34058 [https://perma.cc 
/2C6Q-VRGK]. 
17. David Welsh, Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conﬂict, 35 SURVIVAL 63, 64 (1993). 
18. For the origins and meaning of the term, see PAUL BJERK, BUILDING A PEACEFUL NATION: JUL-
IUS NYERERE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN TANZANIA, 1960-1964, at 97-108 
(2015). 
19. See generally id.; CRANFORD PRATT, THE CRITICAL PHASE IN TANZANIA 1945-1968: NYERERE 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SOCIALIST STRATEGY (1976). 
20. For further discussion, see BJERK, supra note 18, at 83-96; and PRATT, supra, note 19, at 184-
89. 
21. Nyerere elaborated this view in considerable detail. See, e.g., JULIUS K. NYERERE, FREEDOM 
AND UNITY: UHURU NA UMOJA: A SELECTION FROM WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1952-65, at 85-
98, 152-53, 170-71, 188-94, 212-17, 266-85, 291-97, 300-04, 334-50 (1966). 
22. On the broader context of the movement for African unity, see ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAK-
ING AFTER EMPIRE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2019). 
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welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured,” expressing the aspira-
tions of African peoples “for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity trans-
cending ethnic and national differences.”23 
To Julius Nyerere, Tanganyikan independence represented not a ﬁnal desti-
nation but a way station in a historic movement toward greater human solidarity. 
This movement would be furthered internally by the process of nation-building, 
the creation of a strong sense of common identity; and externally by constructing 
broader frameworks for cooperation and mutual obligation—what we have 
called positive self-determination. As Nyerere wrote in an inﬂuential essay on 
ujamaa: 
It was in the struggle to break the grip of colonialism that we learnt the 
need for unity. We came to recognize that the same socialist attitude of 
mind which, in the tribal days, gave to every individual the security that 
comes of belonging to a widely extended family, must be preserved 
within the still wider society of the nation. But we should not stop there. 
Our recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended 
yet further—beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the 
continent—to embrace the whole society of mankind.24 
For Nyerere, socialism was grounded in a fundamental moral principle: the 
need to care for one another.25 This principle animated much of his philosophy, 
which he characterized as African socialism, distinct from what he viewed as doc-
trinaire European socialism, with its emphasis on class warfare and the inevitable 
conﬂict between people.26 
Nyerere also identiﬁed more pragmatic reasons for African unity. The people 
of the continent, he argued, needed to be in a position to determine their own 
destiny. Mere technical freedom, such as many African nations enjoyed, was not 
enough. Genuine political strength was necessary to ward off domination by 
outside powers. By the same token, it was vital for Africa to gain a modern econ-
omy, which was the only way to escape from poverty. Yet, he observed ruefully, 
at present “none of these things are true, or likely to become true.”27 Africa was 
 
23. Org. of African Unity [OAU] Charter preamble. 
24. NYERERE, supra note 21, at 171. 
25. Id. at 162. For further discussion of Nyerere’s philosophy of ujamaa, see Bonny Ibhawoh & J.I. 
Dibua, Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic 
Development in Africa, 8 AFR. J. POL. SCI. 59 (2003); Ogenga Otunnu, Mwalimu Julius Kam-
barage Nyerere’s Philosophy, Contribution, and Legacies, 13 AFR. IDENTITIES 18 (2015); Viktoria 
Stöger-Eising, Ujamaa Revisited: Indigenous and European Inﬂuences in Nyerere’s Social and Po-
litical Thought, 70 AFRICA 118 (2000). 
26. NYERERE, supra note 21, at 170. 
27. Id. at 336. 
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composed of a collection of independent states, each one of which was subject to 
enormous external pressures, while remaining so weak in isolation that they 
competed with one another for the favors of the wealthy.28 
African unity was therefore essential to prevent political exploitation by 
those outside Africa and to avoid internecine competition for external economic 
beneﬁts. Africa had to be able to police itself effectively and defend itself against 
aggression. It needed to create a common currency and a common market, tear-
ing down customs and tariff walls along a hundred frontiers. “These things re-
quire that in relation to the outside world the separate national states of Africa 
must cease to exist. They must be replaced by Africa.”29 But this did not neces-
sarily mean a unitary state. Rather, it could be a federal state, with a division of 
powers between the center and the constituent parts.30 
Regrettably, after the creation of the OAU, the movement toward African 
unity faltered.31 Likewise, plans for an East African Federation did not progress 
beyond the uniﬁcation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964, which gave birth to 
the state of Tanzania. Even the East African Community, a customs and services 
union that had existed in one form or another since early colonial days, collapsed 
in 1977 due to internal conﬂict.32 Nevertheless, Nyerere’s domestic policies gave 
rise to a modern state that possesses one of the strongest senses of national iden-
tity in Africa, while remaining one of the continent’s most diverse countries. Sur-
veys reveal that over seventy-eight percent of citizens identify themselves pri-
marily as Tanzanian rather than as members of ethnic groups, and a similar 
percentage express signiﬁcant levels of trust in their fellow citizens.33 
The world today has similarities with the Tanganyika of 1961, divided as it is 
into some 195 states, with a profusion of cultures, languages, ethnic 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 338. 
30. Id. at 343. 
31. For an account of the OAU and its successor organization, the African Union, launched in 
2002, see SAMUEL M. MAKINDA ET AL., THE AFRICAN UNION: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PEACE, SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 2016). 
32. RICHARD E. MSHOMBA, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 34-73 (2017). 
33. Gahnström, supra note 16, at 42-45. In Gahnström’s 2008 survey that tested the relative im-
portance of national and ethnic identity, 69% of respondents said they felt exclusively Tanza-
nian, 9% felt more Tanzanian than ethnic, 13% felt both equally, 4% felt more ethnic, and only 
a total of 3% felt exclusively ethnic. Id. at 43. In the same survey, 76% of respondents said they 
trusted other Tanzanians somewhat or a lot. Id. See also Edward Miguel, Tribe or Nation? Na-
tion Building and Public Goods in Kenya Versus Tanzania, 56 WORLD POL. 327 (2004) (suggest-
ing, in an empirical study, that nation-building policies in Tanzania have led to better collec-
tive-action outcomes than in neighboring Kenya). 
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backgrounds, and religions.34 A great majority of world states—by some esti-
mates more than eighty percent—are either multinational or possess signiﬁcant 
national minorities.35 Under the negative theory of national self-determination, 
many of these substate groups would be entitled to opt unilaterally for secession, 
so that most world states would be vulnerable to fragmentation or dismember-
ment, and the fragments themselves would be open to the same threat.36 It is 
hard to see how the cause of human welfare and human rights is well served by 
a theory that enables large-scale splintering along ethnic and religious lines, with 
a concomitant escalation of mistrust and conﬂict. 
In a world of serious periodic disorder, stable boundaries and governmental 
structures often carry substantial beneﬁts for citizens, as frameworks within 
which they may lead their lives in relative peace and security. Yet the negative 
theory of national self-determination assigns little value to the relative order and 
stability represented by existing state structures. The point is not just theoretical. 
Given what history and contemporary events tell us about the potential for inter-
communal conﬂict, any principle that permits ethnic, cultural, and religious 
groups to attempt the restructuring of existing states by unilateral ﬁat often leads 
to extensive turmoil, as various national groups struggle with state governments 
and one another to achieve the most advantageous position.37 More generally, in 
its concern to further the welfare of national groups, the negative theory of na-
tional self-determination does not allow for a ﬁner-grained analysis that takes 
account of the multiple allegiances, commitments, and responsibilities that most 
individuals possess. 
Far from encouraging the growth of expansive and multilayered communal 
bonds, the theory tends to promote a telescoping of communal horizons and a 
narrowing of shared allegiances, actually hardening the often blurry and malle-
able lines that distinguish people on an ethnic and cultural basis. In effect, the 
theory fails to give sufficient weight to the wide range of overlapping communi-
ties that ordinarily have claims on our loyalties: the family, the kin-group, the 
 
34. This ﬁgure is based on the current membership of the United Nations plus two observer 
states. Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945—Present, UNITED NATIONS, https:// 
www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present 
/index.html [https://perma.cc/QD35-Q9JQ]; Non-Member States, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/non-member-states/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J8YA-59LL]. 
35. Welsh, supra note 17, at 65. 
36. See generally John McGarry, ‘Orphans of Secession’: National Pluralism in Secessionist Regions and 
Post-Secession States, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 215 (Margaret Moore 
ed., 1998). 
37. For further discussion, see id.; and Donald L. Horowitz, Self-Determination: Politics, Philoso-
phy, and Law, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 181 (Margaret Moore ed., 
1998). 
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neighborhood, the school, the church, mosque, or temple, the workplace, the 
sports club, the ethnic community, the town, the province, the state, and the 
universal community of humanity as a whole. In considering the multiplicity of 
these allegiances and the varying importance they may have for individual self-
identity and well-being, it seems doubtful whether the claims of any single na-
tional group should be privileged to the extent suggested. In the end, the theory 
attaches limited value to multiple senses of allegiance and belonging, ignoring 
the fact that, for many people, it is the very multiplicity of these allegiances that 
makes up their identity.38 
When Julius Nyerere stepped down as President of Tanzania in 1985, his 
hopes for a federal union with other East African countries remained unrealized. 
Yet the story does not end there. Within ﬁfteen years, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda signed a treaty reviving the defunct East African Community.39 Echoing 
Nyerere’s ideals, the Treaty affirms that greater cooperation “will raise the stand-
ards of living of African peoples, maintain and enhance the economic stability, 
foster close and peaceful relations among African states and accelerate the suc-
cessive stages in the realisation of the proposed African Economic Community 
and Political Union.”40 In 2005, a full-ﬂedged customs union took force among 
the partner states, and ﬁve years later a protocol for establishing a common mar-
ket became operational.41 
The membership of the Community has also expanded. In 2007, Rwanda 
and Burundi joined the organization, and in 2016 South Sudan became the sixth 
member.42 The combined population of the Community now totals 177 million 
people, comprising a land area of 2.5 million square kilometers and over two 
hundred ethnic groups, languages, and cultures.43 Very recently, the Democratic 
 
38. For more on this point, see Brian Slattery, Our Mongrel Selves: Pluralism, Identity and the Na-
tion, in COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS: RIGHTS OF COMMUNITY 85-120 (Ysolde Gendreau ed., 2003). 
On the multiplicity and ﬂuidity of identities, see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE LIES THAT 
BIND: RETHINKING IDENTITY 69-104 (2018); and RORY STEWART, THE MARCHES: A BORDER-
LAND JOURNEY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND (2016). 
39. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Nov. 30, 1999, East African 
Community (2002). 
40. Id. preamble. 
41. For a detailed discussion, see MSHOMBA, supra note 32, at 74-121. 
42. Overview of EAC, E. AFR. CMTY., https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac [https://perma.cc 
/A592-8GJ5]. 
43. Id.; see also East African Community Vision 2050: Regional Vision for Socio-Economic Transfor-
mation and Development, E. AFR. CMTY. 17 (2015), http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle 
/11671/567/EAC%20Vision%202050%20FINAL%20DRAFT%20OCT-%202015.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6C9G-BMEJ]. For varying appraisals of the Community, see ARTHUR BAINOMUGI-
SHA & SABASTIANO RWENGABO, THE PROMISE AND EFFICACY OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMU-
NITY (2016); Davor Jancic, Regional Parliaments and African Economic Integration, 30 EUR. J. 
the yale law journal forum February 24, 2020 
646 
Republic of the Congo applied to join the Community, which would extend the 
union across a broad swath of Africa, from the east coast to the west.44 
On the political level, plans for an East African Federation have also been 
moving ahead. In 2017, the heads of the partner states identiﬁed confederation 
as a transitional stage on the road to political federation, and the following year 
a committee of experts was charged with the job of drafting a regional constitu-
tion, with a target date of 2023. Signiﬁcant obstacles remain, such that one com-
mentator has been moved to invoke the Swahili proverb: haraka, haraka, haina 
baraka—hurry, hurry has no blessing.45 In the long run, nevertheless, Julius Nye-
rere’s hopes for greater African unity may yet be realized.46 
conclusion  
What lessons may be drawn from these ongoing efforts in East Africa? There 
is much to be said on this score—taking us far beyond the present Essay. But one 
lesson stands out. The negative theory of national self-determination miscon-
strues the task that lies ahead of us, which is the construction of broader frame-
works for human interaction—frameworks that strengthen mutual respect and 
sense of obligation, building greater community and solidarity. Such frame-
works are the essential basis for the advancement of human well-being and hu-
man rights. In their absence, poverty, social conﬂict, and outright war will con-
tinue to be the scourge of humanity, undermining basic rights and destroying 
the conditions essential for individual and group ﬂourishing. 
Not only does the negative theory of national self-determination misunder-
stand what needs to be done, it has the effect of hindering efforts to achieve that 
goal. In tacitly encouraging and enabling political fragmentation, it undermines 
the basic normative structures needed to serve the broader cause of human wel-
fare and rights—paradoxically the very goods it aims to promote. These goods 
are better secured through the creation of multinational frameworks that stimu-
late different ethnic and cultural groups to interact and work for common 
goals—in effect, through positive self-determination 
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The world is not a static place, divided forever into “us” and “them.” As Julius 
Nyerere emphasized, there is a pressing need for humans to broaden their sym-
pathies and moral horizons. Yet a culture of toleration does not spring into ex-
istence unaided. It requires a midwife—in the guise of legal norms. The future 
of humanity depends on constitutional structures that show the other is also us. 
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